This paper attempts to explain international and inter-personal differences in subjective well-being over the final fifth of the twentieth century. The empirical work makes use of data from three waves of the World Values survey covering about fifty different countries. The analysis proceeds in stages. First there is a brief review of some reasons for giving a key role to subjective measures of well-being. This is followed by a survey of earlier empirical studies, a description of the main variables used, a report of results and tests, and discussion of the links among social capital, education, income and well-being.
concluding comments.
Why Study Happiness?
The idea of using self-assessments of well-being, or of life satisfaction, as a way of evaluating the quality of a society and its citizens goes back to Aristotle and beyond. It has been argued that ancient ethics "gets its grip on the individual at this point of reflection: am I satisfied with my life as a whole, and the way it has developed and promises to develop?" (Annas 1993, 28 ).
The Aristotelian view has central importance among ancient and modern views, in part because of its attempt to balance different aspects of satisfaction regarded as antithetical by others. "We may define happiness as prosperity combined with excellence; or as independence of life, or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition for property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everyone agrees. From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, and also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck and excellence. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1360b, 14-23) 2 ". These are views Aristotle considers to be widely held. In developing his own ethical theory, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of a lifetime's virtuous activity, which in turn requires a sufficient supply of external goods if anything is to be achieved. The material goods are a means and not an end 3 . Thus "The
Life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." (Nicomachean Ethics
Book 1: 1096a 6-10). The Stoics differed from Aristotle in placing their whole emphasis on the virtuous life, while Epicureans placed more emphasis than Aristotle on the importance of pleasures, including among these the avoidance of pain in body and soul (Annas 1993, 336) .
advantages one can act excellently...' (Nicomachean Ethics Book 10: 1178b 32-35, 1179a 1-5.)
When faced with such widespread views about the constituents of happiness and the sources of life satisfaction, Aristotle also made a strong appeal for empirical work: "We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose it to be mere theory." (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, 1179, 20-23) This paper takes up Aristotle's challenge, as has much of the previous empirical work on subjective well-being, especially in psychology. Beyond the inherent interest of mapping the correlates of satisfaction, there are also policy-related reasons for paying attention to subjective measures of well-being. One is that many public policies have effects on well-being that flow through productivity and incomes as well as through other channels. Conventional economic analysis can recognize the existence of these other channels, but if the effects are generally positive via one channel but negative through another channel, the net effects of the policy cannot be evaluated unless there is some method for comparing the sizes of the offsetting effects.
If there are ways of tracking the offsetting influences through to subjective well-being, then measures of their relative size may be used to support inferences about the net effects of events or policies under review. negative spillover effects that could affect the evaluation of alternative policies. Since it is not always easy to find comparable measures at the individual and society-wide levels, and since the estimation of two-level effects is limited by the number of countries and years for which surveys are available, this paper provides illustrations rather than definitive conclusions on the existence and size of the key national-level factors determining well-being.
Previous Research
The study of well-being has over the past century taken a distant second place to the study of psychological illness. One count places the number of psychological abstracts since 1887 mentioning anxiety as 100 times greater than those mentioning life satisfaction (Myers 2000, 56) .
Nevertheless there have been many studies of well-being accumulating over the years, and there is evidence of a flowering of new interest, as shown by the more than 300 articles surveyed by Diener et al (1999) . The starting point of that survey of recent work is the earlier survey by Wilson (1967) of the then much more limited evidence on the constituents of happiness.
Wilson's list of attributes of the typical happy person has remarkable similarities to that proposed by Aristotle, since he attributes happiness to the "young, healthy, well-educated, well-paid, extroverted, optimistic, worry-free, religious married person with high self-esteem, job morale, modest aspirations, of either sex and a wide range of intelligence." (Wilson 1967, 214) .
In the subsequent thirty years, there has been a flowering of new results, using experiments, data samples and more complex statistical analysis to study partial effects, causal pathways and non-linearities. Experiments have shown that pleasant affect, unpleasant affect, and life satisfaction are separable constructs (Diener et al 1999, 277) . Since the former two are more responsive to short-term circumstances, much of the well-being literature has focused on measures of life satisfaction. The same reasoning supports the use of a measure of life satisfaction as the dependent variable for the empirical work in this paper.
Previous well-being research has emphasized the joint importance of personality, the social environment and circumstances in determining levels of subjective well-being. Special attention has also been paid to the importance of goals and aspirations, of comparison groups, personal experience, and habituation as joint determinants of how changes in circumstances will affect individual well-being. Personality has been shown to be substantially heritable. Personality differences have been shown to affect self-assessments of well-being, and to influence how an individual responds to unfolding events. Since the data available for large-sample analysis has only limited power to identify personality types, the estimated responses to particular events will necessarily be an average across many different personality types, so that the explanatory power of equations based on individual responses is likely to be small.
Cultural and societal differences are likely to be important determinants of international differences in subjective well-being (Diener 2000) . Since suitable variables and degrees of freedom are scarce, there may well remain international differences in subjective well-being that are not fully explained by available measures of individual and societal differences affecting well-being. One of the major aims of this paper will be to include both individual-level and societal variables as determinants of well-being so as to be able to estimate their separate influences on well-being.
Moving outside the psychology literature, there have been studies using measures of wellbeing in the analysis of economic and social policies. For example, Di Tella et al (2000) have used survey measures of subjective well-being to evaluate the short-term welfare trade-off between inflation and unemployment. They find, echoing earlier work by Clark and Oswald (1994) and Oswald (1997) , that individuals rate the subjective cost of unemployment far higher than the corresponding loss of money income. They also find an apparently high subjective cost of inflation. Although inflation and unemployment are both found to be costly, relative to the well-being effects of higher incomes, the trade-off estimated from the well-being data attaches a much higher relative weight to unemployment than was implicit in the oft-used misery index 4 .
4 In the absence of grounds for any easy alternative, the 'misery index' has been defined as the sum of the percentage unemployment rate and the current annual rate of inflation.
Broadening the scope of analysis, Stutzer (2000, 2002) explain differences in subjective well-being among Swiss cantons using individual variables plus measures of the direct accountability of cantonal administrations, finding that those cantons with more accountable government also show higher average measures of subjective well-being. Putnam ( , 2001 explains individual measures of well-being with individual-level and state-level variables to provide preliminary estimates of the relative contributions of income, health, social connectedness and family status to individual well-being. Some of the related literature is surveyed in Helliwell (2001a) .
Data and Key Variables
This paper analyzes measures of subjective well-being drawn from three successive waves of the World Values Survey (WVS, Inglehart et al 2000) . The first wave was in 1980-82, the second in 1990-91, and the third in the late 1995-97. Although each wave covers a different set of countries, there is sufficient overlap to enable some first assessments of the sources and sizes of international differences and changes in subjective well-being. There are too many changing factors to permit definitive answers, but the sample size is large enough (totalling 87,806 observations spread over three waves and forty-six different countries) to permit many of the relevant factors to be taken into account in a consistent manner.
The first wave of the WVS survey provides data for the current research from 18 industrial countries, all of which were members of the OECD. The 1990-91 second wave provides data from 38 countries and the 1995-97 third wave provides data for 30 countries, excluding many of the previously surveyed OECD countries. The second and third waves, especially the third, contain up to 15 countries or regions from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The changing country coverage means that there is a potential shortage of degrees of freedom for the estimation of national-level linkages simultaneously with the application of two-way fixed effects. Thus there are 49 different countries or sub-national regions represented in one of the three waves, but only 86 total country-wave observations, compared to the 147 there would have been if each country were represented in each of the three waves.
To reduce the number of country fixed-effect variables, in order to leave more degrees of freedom for the estimation of national-level effects, the countries are divided into six groups. The base group, for which no separate variable is required, includes 14 industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and US, with a special sample for Northern Ireland). The other groups include countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU, including Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and special samples from Moscow and the Tambov administrative region), other countries of Eastern Europe (EEUR, including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania), and smaller groups of countries from Latin America (LATAM, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela), Asia (including China, India, Japan and Taiwan), other developing countries (OTHDEV, including Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey), and Scandinavia (SCAN, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). Tests have confirmed that these sub-aggregates combine groups with fairly similar values for well-being, both before and after adjustment for differing values of the independent variables tested. As will be seen, the country groups differ considerably in their average levels of well-being, especially before allowance is made for international differences in individual and societal-level factors influencing well-being. 
Results
We start, in equation 1, with an explanation of subjective well-being based on each The transformations of WVS variables used to select the observations and define the variables are recorded in SPSS syntax files available on request.
6 The distribution of the variable departs from normality by being left-skewed and in displaying some tendency to bunch at the middle and end points. The percentage frequencies of the ten responses, counting from 1 to 10 on the satisfaction scale, are 3.2, 2. 2, 4.8, 5.4, 13.0, 10.4, 14.6, 20.7, 11.9, and 13.3. in subjective well-being7. Given the means and scales of the variables, a 1% increase in average reported health status is associated with just over 1% increase in subjective well-being. From the wording of the life satisfaction and health questions, this presumably reflects primarily a longterm effect, which earlier research (e.g. Brickman et al 1978) has shown to be much smaller than the short-term effect, since expectations and comparison groups adjust so as to cushion the wellbeing effects of changes in health status. Some earlier research has suggested some nonlinearities in the relation between self-assessed health status and subjective well-being, in particular that a drop from 'poor' to 'very poor' health would have a larger well-being cost than other one-point downward movements in health status. To test for this, the equation was reestimated using the central value (3= 'fair health') as the base case, with separate variables for 'very good', 'good', 'poor' and 'very poor'. The results did show higher well-being equivalents for below-average health than for above average health. Although all of the one-point differences had coefficients that were significantly different from each other, they all lie within the range 0.46 to 0.86. In this sample of data the largest differences relate to differences between the base case and either poor health (-.856) or good health (+.622). To be in very good rather than good health adds a further 0.520 to subjective well-being, while being in very poor rather than poor health is matched by an average additional drop of 0.462). The well-being equivalent of being in very good health rather than very poor health is thus 2.46 points on the 10-point well-being scale 8 . Since the other coefficients in the equation are not affected by splitting the health variable, the further analysis will make use of the simpler form adopted in equation 1.
There is reason to expect that the health coefficient in equation 1 may overstate the size 7 Holding all other individual and societal variables constant in equation 2, a disaggregation in the health variable between OECD and the rest produces almost identical results: -0.608 for OECD and -0.609 for the rest.
8 This is smaller than five times the 0.61 estimated in equation 1 because the sample responses are unequally divided, with more responses in the groups with larger differences from adjacent groups. In particular, the distribution of responses among the five groups ranging from very good to very poor are 22.7%, 37.2%, 31.3%, 7.3% and 1.6%. This may to some extent reflect a lower sampling probability for those who would self-describe themselves as being in very bad health. of the long-term effect of objective health status on subjective well-being, since both are affected in the same direction by personality differences. Individuals whose personalities are inherently more optimistic are more likely to give positive assessments of their health status and their subjective well-being (Okun and George 1984) . Comparisons of identical twins raised together and apart (Tellegen et al 1988, Lykken and Tellegen 1996) suggest that a large fraction of longterm interpersonal differences in personality is genetic in nature. Although this fact may bias upwards estimates of the long-term linkages between health and well-being, optimism creates real linkages as well, since there is ample research showing that those who are optimistic about their health prospects, even unrealistically so, have better health outcomes than do those facing the same prognosis with a less optimistic frame of mind (e.g. Schier et al 1989) .
The second independent variable relates to the individual's employed status, with unemployment represented by 1.0, with a zero value for those who are either employed or out of the labour force. Being unemployed lowers subjective well-being by as much as a one-unit drop on the five-point health scale, averaging -0.61 on the ten-point satisfaction scale. Comparisons with income and other effects will be made later, but even before that, it can be reported that these results confirm the earlier findings by Clark and Oswald (1994) and Di Tella et al (2000) that individuals report large well-being reductions from being unemployed. It is not possible to tell from these data how long the surveyed individuals have been, or expect to be, unemployed, so no attempts can be made to disentangle habituation effects, which would tend to lessen the well-being effect of long-standing unemployment, from the offsetting build-up of debt and despair, and the associated obsolescence of job-related human capital. The likely importance of habituation effects may be part of the reason why the estimated effect of unemployment on life satisfaction is significantly greater for respondents in OECD countries9.
The next series of variables relate to family status. We lack information about any aspect of respondents' prior family history, including how long they have been married, separated or divorced, or whether there have been previous marriages. Thus we have nothing to contribute to the debate about whether findings of weaker correlations between well-being and marriage in some previous studies may be due to rising proportions of the now-married who are veterans of previous marriages and divorces. It is possible, however, to test whether, as some studies have indicated (Argyle 1987) , marriage contributes more to the subjective well-being of men than of women. Separating the marriage effect by gender showed no difference between men and women, so that the equation reported makes no such split. The relevant literature on both debates is surveyed by Diener et al. (1999, 290) . The results in equation 1 show a hierarchy of wellbeing, with those who are married being happiest, followed by the 'living as married', widows or widowers, the divorced, and the separated. The difference between being married and separated amounts to almost three-quarters of a point on the ten point scale, or more than being unemployed. The fact that being separated is worse than being divorced may reflect habituation and recovery effects that presumably have had more time to work for those who are currently divorced than for those who are separated. Most divorces follow separations so that the average divorced person has been either separated or divorced for longer than the average separated person has been separated.
The results for the education variables may be surprising, since education has been found to be the strongest systematic determinant of individual participation in a variety of social activities, and social connections have been linked to increased health and well-being . In equation 1 the partial effects of differing levels of education on subjective well-being are found to be small and insignificant. One explanation for this finding is that in equation 1 any beneficial effects of education flowing though higher incomes, better health, and higher perceived trust levels are already taken into account. Also it should be noted that the education variables are among the weakest in the WVS data, being based solely on the ages at which individuals finish their full-time education. This is a very imperfect guide to how much education has been received or what results or qualifications have been obtained. Education ages and quality also differ much from country to country, and much of the variance in the WVS sample is across countries. However, it is reasonable to conclude, in a provisional way, that in this international context those who have stayed in full-time education until a later age are not systematically more satisfied with their lives, once account has been taken of the higher incomes, wider participation and better health that might have been facilitated by their education. To confirm that education does have important indirect effects on well-being requires additional experiments, which have been undertaken and will be reported in the subsequent section.
What about age? Wilson (1967) surveyed the earlier literature, and characterized the happy person as being young. Subsequent studies have been able to separate the age linkages more systematically from those of income, health and other variables. More recent reviews (Myers and Diener 1995, Diener et al 1999) have dismissed Wilson's conclusion, and found no systematic age pattern. Perhaps because the WVS sample is so large, and health and income are separately accounted for, the WVS current results show a strong U-shaped pattern of the sort previously found by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) for Britain and the United States, and replicated in other recent studies. The base group comprises those aged 18-24. Those in the next three age groups are significantly less happy than those aged 18-24, providing some partial support for the earlier view that life is happier for the young. However after reaching a low point among the 35-44 year-old group, subjective well-being thereafter rises systematically and significantly, with those 55 to 64 as happy as those aged 18 to 24, and those aged 65 and up much happier still. The size of the changes is large, with those over 65 having well-being more than one-half point higher (on the ten-point scale) than those 35 to 44, a difference almost as great as that between the employed and unemployed.10
Earlier research has found a strong correlation between measures of religious activity and 10 The age coefficients for OECD are: 25-34: -0.224, 35-44: -0.383, -0.368, 45-54: -0.368, 55-64: -0.126, 65+: 0.267 . The corresponding coefficients for the rest of the sample are: 25-34: -0.168, 35-44: -0.324, 45-54: -0.305, 55-64: -0 .0774, 65+: 0.06341. The general pattern is the same in the two groups of countries, but old age is more satisfying in the OECD countries. subjective well-being. There has been some debate as to whether this is due to the support provided by religious beliefs and convictions or to the social and community networks provided by regular participation in church activities. The WVS data permit these two channels to be separately evaluated, since respondents are asked about the importance of God to their lives as well as how frequently they attend church. The results show that both variables have strong and easily distinguished linkages to life satisfaction. Those who report that God is very important to their lives (33% of the sample) have life satisfaction measures higher by 0.34, with the effect of weekly or more frequent church attendance (22% of the sample) also being significant, although only one-third as large 11 . Tests of differences of these effects among religious faiths show that they apply across all major faiths.
11 The simple correlation between the two variables is 0.40. Of the roughly 29,000 for whom God is very important, fewer than half go to church one or more times per week. Of the 20,000 who go to church at least once per week, two-thirds report that God is very important to their lives.
As a prelude to consideration of variables relating to measures of the quality of national institutions, equation 1 considers individual assessments of some key elements of each nation's social capital. There are two variables relating to each individual's own participation in voluntary organizations of all types except church groups, since church affiliation and participation is covered by a separate variable. One variable (MEM12) covers the first two waves of the survey, while the other relates to the third wave (MEM3). Two variables are used because the voluntary associations question was asked differently in the third wave, producing significantly higher average participation rates (Inglehart et al. 2000) . The different average participation rate in the third wave will also be responsible for part of the coefficient on the fixed effect for the third wave. The coefficients on both membership variables show that individuals who are involved in more voluntary associations report higher average satisfaction with their lives. The variable measures the total number of membership types for each respondent. The coefficient on the variable for the first two waves suggests that someone with an additional voluntary group membership, with an average degree of involvement, has well-being that is higher by 0.05, about a tenth as much as marriage. The number is estimated to be twice as large in the third wave. Since optimistic individuals are more likely to report themselves satisfied with life, and to assume the best from new ventures, they are probably also more likely to join and participate in voluntary associations. Thus the positive partial correlation between individual memberships and well-being may reflect in part the common influence of personality differences, just as was argued above for physical health. However, it will be shown later that societies with high averages of social capital, as measured by membership densities, also show higher levels of subjective well-being, other things held constant. This relation cannot be readily attributed to personality differences amongst individuals, since these average out at the national level.
The 'NOCHEAT" variable takes the value of 1.0 for every individual who thinks that it is never justifiable to cheat on taxes. As shown in Table 1 , slightly more than half of the respondents think that cheating on taxes is never justifiable, and equation 1 shows that they systematically report themselves more satisfied with their lives. The same is true for those who reply 'yes' when asked if they think that, in general, people can be trusted, rather than the alternative that you cannot be too careful when dealing with people. It is tempting to treat this positive effect of trust assessments as representing the well-recognized individual benefits of living in a high-trust society. However, it cannot be only that, as equation 2 will show shortly that the coefficient on individual differences in trust assessments remains unchanged even after national differences in trustworthiness are taken into account separately.
Perhaps this is one more instance where optimism produces higher assessments of both trust and well-being. An alternative view is that individuals differ in their sub-national communities, and their answers relate to the run of people with whom they interact, and not to the nation as a whole. This alternative view would permit the interpretation of the positive effect as representing the benefits of living in a high-trust community, assuming that most of the interpersonal differences in trust assessments represented differences among communities in the same nation in the average level of trustworthy behaviour.
Earlier studies and surveys of the literature on the effects of income on subjective wellbeing provide an ambiguous picture. For samples of data including individuals within the same country, those with higher relative incomes generally 12 show significantly higher measures of subjective well-being, although the magnitude of the effect is often described as small (Diener et al 1999, 287) . It has also been noted that big increases in individual income or wealth, such as those provided by a large lottery win, show well-being effects that are positive but declining with time to fairly small residual levels Razell 1975, Brickman et al 1978) . Simple crosscountry correlations of GDP per capita and measures of subjective well-being show a significant positive correlation (Myers and Diener 1995, 13) , but countries with faster-growing GDP per capita have not shown corresponding increases in well-being (Easterlin 1974 , Myers and Diener 1995 , 13, Oswald 1997 . In some countries there is evidence of increasing prevalence of materialistic goals among the young (Astin, Korn and Riggs 1993) , which might be thought to lead to larger or more significant higher well-being effects from higher incomes. However, other studies found that individuals attaching high subjective values to financial success have lower values for subjective well-being, even when their financial aspirations were met. Ryan 1993, 1996) .
12 But Clark and Oswald (1994) do not find a significant effect in their sample of UK data.
The WVS data offer some advantages and some disadvantages in identifying the linkages between income and well-being. The advantages flow from the very large sample size, and the inclusion of countries and individuals with very different levels of income. The disadvantages relate to the difficulties of comparing relative incomes among countries and among individuals.
To compare incomes across countries, we use real GDP per capita, measured at purchasing power parities, in the year of the survey, making use of the Penn World Tables, as updated in the World Bank growth dataset. To capture individual incomes, the WVS asks respondents to place their family incomes on a ten-point scale, where the ranges they are offered are supposed to be based on the family income deciles in that country and year.
Theory and some previous research suggest that the effects of individual and national incomes may be non-linear in nature, with smaller well-being effects attached to increases in income beyond levels sets by each individual's or society's expectations and habits (Offer 2000) .
Habituation effects are hard to establish with the WVS data, since there is no way to tell how the family incomes reported relate to recent or normal levels. To search for non-linearity of the individual relative income variable, the equation includes the decile value (where the range is from .1 to 1, and the mean is 0.5) and the decile value squared. In equation 1, both take significant coefficients, with signs that imply diminishing returns to higher relative incomes. For an individual to move from the fourth to the fifth decile in the distribution of family incomes raises well-being by +0.10 (=1.91*.1-.96*.09), while to move from the ninth to the tenth decile is associated with an increase in well-being of only 0.01 (=1.91*.1-.96*.19). This is despite the fact that for most countries the move from the ninth to the tenth decile involves a much larger absolute and relative increase in income than to move from the fourth to the fifth decile. Thus there are sharply decreasing well-being effects from higher incomes relative to those elsewhere in the same country 13 13 The situation is more complicated if one uses separate variables for each income decile, with the lowest decile as a base case. The changes to subjective well-being from each of the nine steps from the second to the tenth decile (with the basis for comparison being respondents in the lowest decile) are +.091, +.190, +.138, +.113, +.024, +.125, +.015, -.012, and +.090. The general pattern of declining increments is apparent, but there is some evidence of additional sense of well-being from being in the top decile, which represents in many countries a substantial increase in income from the deciles immediately below. Subsequent work has established a clear distinction between the effects of relative income in the OECD and in the developing countries. For the poorer countries, there continue to be significant increases in subjective well-being from increases in relative income throughout the ten deciles, while for OECD countries, the increases in well-being with income are concentrated in the first four deciles, with no significant increases in subjective well-being beyond that point (holding constant all other variables, of course). When the effects are estimated separately for OECD and non-OECD countries, they are: OECD: -0.0325 (not significant), +0.00179 (not significant), +0.124,+0.208, +0.195, +0.243, +0.232, To extend the analysis internationally, and to try to disentangle the statistical effects of absolute income levels from those of domestic and international relative incomes, it is necessary to make the first addition of national variables, as reported in equation 2. Adding several national variables alters the size and significance of the individual variables surprisingly little, even where, as in the case of trust, the national value being used is the national average of the corresponding individual variable.
The addition of variables describing the structure of the national society raises the explained variance from 25.5% to 26.3% if the regional and time variables are in the equations, or from 15% to 25.6% if they are not. Comparing the regional variables and the national societal variables as means of explaining the variation in well-being not explained by individual factors, the national variables are collectively slightly more powerful (25.6% of variance explained by the national variables compared to 25.5% for the time and regional variables, with individual-level variables included in both cases). The national societal variables and the regional variables are partly substitutes and partly complements, in that both remain highly significant in equation 2 which contains both. Our main interpretation will centre on equation 2 rather than on equation 1, which excludes regional effects. This is a not matter of much consequence, as comparison of the two equations show that the inclusion of regional effects does not generally change the coefficients on the societal variables. The main exceptions are those for education, due to low well-being and high education levels in the FSU and Eastern European countries. Thus although it is clear that there is ample scope to find new explanations for the remaining regional effects, the current societal variables are not achieving their success merely as back-door ways of capturing regional differences based on other factors. However, subsequent robustness checks suggest that attempts to increase the number of country dummy variables, or to change the country's average relative to the value for 1997 in the United States. The logarithm and the square of this variable are then included, and both attract highly significant coefficients. This pair of variables is strongly preferred by the data to simply the level and the square, or to any of the three variables on their own. We find that national average income also has diminishing returns, since the logarithm of average per capita income takes a positive coefficient, while the square takes a negative coefficient. Use of dummy variables for each decile of the international distribution of national average per capita incomes shows evidence of a double hump, with local peaks about one-third and two-thirds of the way up the national income ladder. However, the use of decile data reduces excessively the number of degrees of freedom available to identify significant national income and other national-level effects. Grouping of deciles will be used later in the paper to address this issue. It is much easier to use individual deciles to establish relative income effects within each country, because the sample sizes are large enough to identify fairly stable and very significant patterns, and to establish different patterns for the OECD and developing countries. A fresh round of data from the larger end-of-century WVS survey should help to better establish the cross-sectional and time series effects of differences in average incomes.
The next societal variable to be added is the average level of interpersonal trust. This is as estimated by the national average answer to the question: "In general, do you think that people can be trusted, or alternatively, that you can't be too careful when dealing with people?
14 " Knack The coefficient of 0.32 implies that average well-being would increase by .03 on a ten-point scale for each 0.1 increase in the proportion of the population judging that people can in general be trusted. A difference of 0.1 in average trust levels is less than the sample standard deviation of 0.14, and less than one-third of the difference between trust levels in France and Norway, a comparison used by Grjebine (2000) and Helliwell (2001a) in the analysis of international differences in traffic behaviour and road fatalities.
The next societal variable is based on a large World Bank effort to collect and analyze
measures of the quality of governance for more than 150 countries in the 1990s. The authors Zoido-Lobatoni 1999a, 1999b) summarize and interpolate data collected by others for an average of more than 25 different indicators of the quality of governance, divided into six separate aspects: voice and accountability, stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, the regulatory framework, the rule of law, and the control of corruption. For each group of indicators, the measures are scaled to have a mean of zero across all of the countries included, and a range from +2.5 to -2.5. An aggregate formed by summing the five measures to a single index of the quality of governance (GOVTOT) has a mean of 0.65 for the countries represented in the WVS data, and ranges from 1.72 for Switzerland at the top to -1.00 for Nigeria at the bottom. There are many reasons why higher values for such a variable would be associated with higher average levels of subjective well-being. Many services crucial to individuals and families, ranging from education and health to justice and transportation, are regulated and provided by governments. The quality of the services received, for any given amount of resources expended, is likely to be higher where the overall quality of government is higher. Perhaps more important, the confidence with which individuals face their future is likely to depend considerably on the confidence with which they can rely on government services being available when and where they are needed.
The coefficient of .32 (t=12.0) on the GOVTOT variable implies substantial well-being benefits from improvements in the quality of governance. For example, an improvement in the quality of government in Belarus (-.76) to that of Hungary (+.87) would (if the relation were causal) increase the average well-being of a citizen of Belarus by more than marriage, by about as much as the combined effect of religious belief and church attendance, and almost as much as moving from the bottom to the top decile in the country's income distribution.
Two societal variables were considered for physical health-the infant mortality rate and the average life expectancy. Life expectancy had no significant effect. An earlier version of this paper identified a significant effect of the infant mortality rate, which was eventually found to have the wrong sign, and in any event be due for its significance to entirely to one country (Japan) which had the lowest infant mortality rate (4.3 per 10,000, compared to 7.1 per 10,000 in the United States, and a high of 81.1 in Nigeria), and also with subjective well-being lower than its circumstances would otherwise have suggested. More research is required to gather better societal level measures of averages levels and distribution of states of physical health. When the next round of WVS data becomes available, there will be more degrees of freedom to identify different patterns of national and possible even sub-national level contextual effects. A first fairly obvious norm to consider is whether the members of a society readily agree to pay their allotted shares of the costs of their collective actions. A natural measure for this is the national average fraction of respondents who think that it is never appropriate to cheat on their taxes. We have already seen that individuals who think that cheating on taxes is wrong have higher subjective well-being. Now we are in a position to see if their well-being is systematically higher if they live in a society in which people generally think that it is wrong to cheat on taxes.
Social Capital, Education and Well-Being
The coefficient on the national average measure (NOCHEATN) The evidence from all types of memberships suggests that there are positive spillovers to the well-being of others. Previous research did not find any such spillovers from memberships to economic growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997 , Helliwell 1996a , Knack 2001 , and in any event income levels are already accounted for in equation 2, so the national membership effects in equation 2 would seem to flow directly to well-being rather than through income or trust. The estimated effects are large and significant. If everyone joined one additional group, the resulting increase in well-being would exceed that from marriage. Using the third wave coefficients, for example, the average well-being would increase by .06 from the individual effect and .58 from the national effect, for a total effect of 0.64. Of course, such an increase would be historically unprecedented, and represents a larger difference than that between the most and least horizontally connected of the national societies included in the data. The most important feature of these results is that the spillover effects on the well-being of others are estimated to be substantially larger than the direct benefits, even after taking into account any benefits that may have flowed through higher trust or higher incomes.
Turning to education, equation 2 includes a measure of the average educational attainment in each society, measured in completed years. The data are based on the de la Fuente and Donénech (2000) estimates for the OECD countries and the Barro and Lee (1996) .173 (t=6).
Adjusting for the international differences in personal and especially national variables has the effect of sharply reducing the otherwise unexplained regional effects, and of shifting the Latin American effect from negative to positive. In all cases the comparisons are with the remaining OECD countries. This implies that relative to the main body of OECD countries, the key explanatory variables are less favourable in all of the developing regions, and especially in the FSU and Eastern Europe, than in the OECD. The reverse is true for the Scandinavian countries, which have more beneficial values for most variables than is the case elsewhere in the OECD. Even after allowing for these effects, self-assessments of well-being in Scandinavia remain higher than elsewhere in the OECD. In Latin America, even though self-assessed wellbeing is lower than in OECD countries, the differential is less than our model would predict, so that when the full model is applied the surveyed Latin Americans are more satisfied with their lives than their circumstances would suggest.
Robust Estimation of a Revised Equation
In some respects, the results in equation 2 seem too good to be true, showing independently significant effects of a wide range of individual and national effects. With respect to the national effects, such scepticism is justified. The least squares estimation adopted for equation 2 assumes that each observation is drawn from the same distribution, thus providing a very large number of degrees of freedom. However, there are no doubt systematic differences among countries in the error terms as well as in the key variables used in the equation. Thus it is appropriate to adopt an estimation strategy that calculates robust standard errors recognizing the correlation of error terms among respondents in the same country (Moulton 1990 ). This has the effect of reducing to about 50 the number of independent observations available for estimating the effects of national variables. This does not change the values of the coefficients, but does increase, almost threefold, the standards errors on the national variables. This increase in standard errors removes some of what previously were significant differences among sub-groups, and suggests a slimmer specification of key national variables. Separate coefficients are then estimated for the additional well-being for those in countries with 20 to 50% of US per capita GDP, 50 to 75%, and over 75%. As can be seen, the well-being effects of living in higher income countries are small and insignificant, and do not show any evidence of subsequent increase once GDP per capita exceeds half that in the United States in the mid 1990s. Yet it remains the case that on average, subjective well-being is much higher in OECD than in non-OECD countries, and the OECD countries are also much richer. Why this apparent paradox? The reasoning is the similar to that in the case of education. A reduced-form equation shows that subjective well-being is higher in the richer countries, but both education and income effects fall out in the full model, which includes health, social connections, and the quality of government, all of which are higher in the richer countries22. Those who have the 21 Consideration was also given a variable that takes the value of 1.0 for each respondent who thinks that 'most or all public officials (in the country) are engaged in bribe-taking and corruption.' This is perhaps the best individual-level assessment of governmental quality available from the WVS survey data, and shows systematically higher subjective well-being among those who do not view their governments as corrupt. There is a strongly significant correlation between this individual-level measure and the aggregate measure of governmental quality. Including the individual-level view of corruption does not drive out the aggregate variable, which remains highly significant even with the revised estimation methods. However, the final version of equation 5 leaves out this variable, since the question was not asked in all countries and in all waves, so that its inclusion could bias the residual estimates of country and region effects. The coefficient on corrupt was -.08 (t=5.8), with most other coefficients unchanged to 3 or 4 significant figures.
22 To be more specific, when only the three average income variables are included in a linear equation with robust standard errors, the well-being effects grow with each income group, being +1.01 (t=3.0) for y2050 (relative to countries with y less than 20% of that in the United States), 1.61 (t=4.8) for y5075, and 1.87 (t=5.5) for yover75. Adding govtot to the equation cuts these effects in half, and renders them insignificant. Adding health status makes the income effects start to fall after the middle income range is reached. If average education and the income variables are used in alternative equations, the education variable is stronger than the income highest levels of subjective well-being are not those who live in the richest countries, but those who live where social and political institutions are effect, where mutual trust is high, and corruption is low.
Equation 5 also re-estimates the specific regional effects, which reflect international differences in subjective well-being that remain significant even after allowing for all of the 
Conclusions and Prospects
This paper has attempted to illustrate rather than exhaust the possibilities for using international well-being data to measure and explain differences in well-being within and among especially low there, and education levels high.
One of the particular branches of social science that has much to gain from systematic use of well-being data is the study of the causes and consequences of social capital. The widespread interest among social scientists and policy-makers in social capital has much to do with influential studies, especially those of Putnam (1995 that have shown sharp falls in trust and participation over the past forty years in the United States, following a period of rapid rise over the first sixty years of the twentieth century. The final decades of the twentieth century have also seen rapid economic growth and greater inequality of income distribution in the United
States. Are these economic and social trends connected? If so, then how, and how can they be jointly assessed?
The last decade of the past century started with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This led to rapidly increased openness in the countries formerly behind the iron curtain. The fall of the Wall was thought at the time to presage, with good luck and help from others, fairly rapid convergence of economic and social conditions towards those in Western Europe (Marer and Zecchini 1991).
But in the succeeding decade, as the WVS and other data document starkly, things have gone from bad to worse in many of the countries involved, and even in the luckiest and likeliest countries the standards of material and overall well-being are now barely matching what they were in 199023.
There are many ways in which the preliminary research reported here invites further tests and extensions. One feature missing entirely from this paper is consideration of the extent to which geography matters. The paper has made use of regional variables, for example, on the assumption (supported by the data) that well-being moves in similar ways in at least some groups of neighbouring countries. The paper has made even more use of national variables, assuming, with some justification but not much testing, that national borders do indeed define the edges where societal cleavages are most abrupt. The WVS data do contain sub-national regions, so that it should be possible to test more extensively whether intra-national well-being linkages are tighter than those across national borders, much as has already been done for trade, capital, and migration linkages 24 .
24 McCallum (1995) discovered that trade linkages were twenty times tighter among Canadian provinces than between Canadian provinces and US states. Helliwell (1998 reports a broader range of evidence, covering many more countries, also suggesting that national borders still mark much more important boundaries in economic and social space than is generally believed. Keller (2000) shows that geography and borders both matter for technological spillovers. Helliwell (1996b) makes a preliminary attempt to combine sub-national and international data for social capital.
Finally, it is important to re-emphasize that in many cases the methodology used in this and earlier studies can establish linkages or correlations but not prove the existence or direction of causation. It is especially important to remember this caution when considering policy initiatives that might help or hinder some type of activity that research has linked to measures of well-being. Unless the causal chain does indeed run from the activity to well-being, the policy change may not have the intended effects. Even if the chain does run in the intended direction, a change in activity level that arises from the policy change may have different consequences from previous changes that arose for other reasons. Thus well-being research does not yet provide a complete guide to choices for private behaviour and public policies. It does enrich substantially the scope for considering the well-being consequences of a broad range of disparate trends, and for using international evidence to illuminate national trends and issues. 
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